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Quantum secure direct communication without using perfect quantum channel
Jian Wang,∗ Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
Most of the quantum secure direct communication protocol needs a pre-established secure quan-
tum channel. Only after insuring the security of quantum channel, could the sender encode the
secret message and send them to the receiver through the secure channel. In this paper, we present
a quantum secure direct communication protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs. It is not
necessary for the present protocol to insure the security of quantum channel before transmitting the
secret message. In the present protocol, all Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs are used to transmit the
secret message except those chosen for eavesdropping check.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 42.79.Sz
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
promising applications of quantum information science.
The goal of QKD is to allow two legitimate parties, Alice
and Bob, to generate a secret key over a long distance, in
the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who interferes with
the signals. Since Bennett and Brassard presented the
original QKD protocol [1], it has been developed quickly.
Recently, a novel concept, quantum secure direct commu-
nication (QSDC) has been proposed [2]. Different from
QKD whose object is to establish a common key between
the communication parties, QSDC’s object is to transmit
the secret messages directly without first establishing a
key to encrypt them. In this paper, we follow the above
definition of QSDC.
QSDC can be used in some special environments which
has been shown by Bostro¨em and Deng et al. [3, 4]. The
works on QSDC attracted a great deal of attentions [2-
8]. We can divide these works into two kinds, one uti-
lizes entangled state [3, 4, 6, 7, 8], the other utilizes sing-
photon [5]. Bostro¨m and Felbinger proposed a Ping-Pong
QSDC protocol which is quasi-secure for secure direct
communication if perfect quantum channel is used [3].
Deng et al. put forward a two-step QSDC protocol using
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs (hereafter called
Deng’s protocol) [4] and a QSDC scheme with a quantum
one-time pad [5]. Feng Li Yan and Xiao Qiang Zhang
presented a QSDC scheme using EPR pairs and telepor-
tation (hereafter called Yan’s scheme) [6]. The security
of most of QSDC schemes relies on a pre-established se-
cure quantum channel. Deng et al. pointed out the basic
requirement for QSDC scheme in [5], which eavesdrop-
ping check before the message being encoded must be
performed first. Only in this way, can the sender utilize
the checked channel to encode the secret message and
transmit it to the receiver.
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Actually, the communication parties, Alice and Bob
can obtain a common key as long as a secure quantum
channel is established. Alice can then send her secret
messages to Bob directly by classical channel. For ex-
ample, in Yan’s scheme [6], Alice and Bob can obtain
a common key as long as they measure their particles in
the Z-basis. It is not necessary for the sender to transmit
her secret to the receiver using teleportation after insur-
ing the security of quantum channel. Note that it needs
two-bit classical information to recovery one bit secret
message in Yan’s scheme. It would be better to transmit
directly the secret to the receiver using classical channel.
Suppose the secret messages to be transmitted is 101001
and the common key between Alice and Bob is 001101.
Alice tells Bob to reorder his results of measurements by
choosing his result of the third, the first, the fourth, the
second, the fifth, and the sixth particle in turn. That is
to say Bob can recover Alice’s secret messages 101001 as
long as he reorders his results of measurements accord-
ing Alice’s classical messages and the eavesdropper, Eve
cannot obtain any information about the secret.
In this paper, we present a QSDC protocol with EPR
pairs without insuring the security of quantum channel
before transmitting the secret message. The secret mes-
sage is deterministically sent through the quantum chan-
nel. We also show the present protocol is secure and
efficient.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec.II, we de-
scribe the process of the QSDC protocol. In Sec.III, we
discuss the security and efficiency of the present protocol.
Finally, we give a summary in Sec.IV.
II. THE QSDC PROTOCOL
In the QSDC protocol, we suppose the sender Al-
ice wants to send a secret message to the receiver, say
Bob directly. The basic idea of the protocol origi-
nates from quantum teleportation[9]. Alice entangles
his encoded secret message state with prepared EPR
pairs. She then performs controlled-NOT (CNOT) op-
eration and Hadamard transformation, which is similar
2to the method used in quantum teleportation. Yan’s
scheme utilized the method of quantum teleportation
faithfully. After insuring the security of quantum chan-
nel, the receiver performs unitary operation on his parti-
cle to recover the sender’s secret message according to the
sender’s classical message. The basic idea of our proto-
col is different from Yan’s scheme. Instead of performing
unitary operation to recover Alice’s secret message, Bob
measures his particle in a fixed measuring basis and re-
covers Alice’s secret message according to the correlation
between two parties’ results. The QSDC protocol is as
follows:
(1)Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pairs in the state
|φ〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB. (1)
We denotes the ordered N EPR pairs with
{[P1(A),P1(B)], [P2(A),P2(B)], · · · , [PN (A),PN (B)]},
where the subscript indicates the pair order in the
sequence, and A, B represents the two particles of
each EPR pair, respectively. Alice takes one particle
from each EPR pair to form an ordered EPR partner
particle sequence [P1(A), P2(A),· · · , PN(A)], called A
sequence. The remaining EPR partner particles compose
B sequence, [P1(B), P2(B),· · · , PN (B)]. Alice transmits
B sequence to Bob.
(2) Bob selects randomly a sufficiently large subset of
B sequence and performs Hadamard transformations
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(2)
on them. He then announces publicly the position of
the selected particles. The Hadamard transformation is
crucial for the security of the protocol as we will see in
the sequel.
(3) After hearing from Bob, Alice executes Hadamard
transformations on the corresponding particles of A se-
quence. She then selects randomly a sufficiently large
subset of particles from A sequence, which we call C se-
quence. Alice generates a random bit string and encodes
it on C sequence. If Alice’s random bit is “0”(“1”), she
prepares a particle a in the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉)
(|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)) for each particle of C sequence.
C sequence is used to check eavesdropping, which we
call checking sequence. The remaining particles of A se-
quence forms D sequence. D sequence is used to encode
Alice’s secret message, which we call encoding sequence.
Alice then encodes her secret message on D sequence. If
Alice’s secret message is “0”(“1”), she prepares a particle
a in the state |+〉 (|−〉) for each particle of D sequence.
Thus Alice prepares N particles for each particle of A
sequence, which we call a sequence [P1(a), P2(a),· · · ,
PN(a)].
(4) If the state of the particle Pi(a) is |+〉, then
the state of the particle Pi(a), Pi(A), and Pi(B) (i =
1, 2, · · · , N) is
|Φ0〉aAB =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)a ⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB, (3)
where the subscript a denotes the particle Pi(a). If the
state of the particle Pi(a) is |−〉, then the state of the
particle Pi(a), Pi(A), and Pi(B) is
|Φ1〉aAB =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)a ⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB. (4)
(5) Alice sends the particle Pi(a), Pi(A) (i =
1, 2, · · · , N) through a CNOT gate (the particle Pi(a)
is the controller, the particle Pi(A) is the target). Then
|Φ0〉aAB is changed to
|Φ′
0
〉
aAB
=
1
2
(|000〉+ |110〉+ |011〉+ |101〉)aAB, (5)
and |Φ1〉aAB becomes
|Φ′
1
〉
aAB
=
1
2
(|000〉 − |1100〉+ |0111〉 − |101〉)aAB . (6)
(6) Alice performs Hadamard transformation on the
particle Pi(a), obtaining
|Φ′′
0
〉
aAB
=
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)B
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)B
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)B
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|1〉 − |0〉)B] (7)
or
|Φ′′
1
〉
aAB
=
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)B
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)B
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|1〉 − |0〉)B
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)B]. (8)
(7) Alice then measures the particle Pi(a), Pi(A) in
the Z-basis, {|0〉, |1〉}. Bob measures the particle Pi(B)
in the X-basis, {|+〉, |−〉}. At this step, although Bob
obtains his result of measurement, he cannot recover Al-
ice’s secret message without Alice’s result. We can draw
the above conclusion according to the equation 7 and 8.
(8) Alice informs Bob the positions of C sequence
(checking sequence) and lets him announce his corre-
sponding results of measurements. Alice judges whether
her random bits can be reconstructed correctly by com-
bining Bob’s results and her results of C sequence. If
the error rate is small, Alice can conclude that there is
no eavesdroppers in the line. Alice and Bob continue to
perform the next step, otherwise they abort the commu-
nication.
3TABLE I: The recovery of Alice’s secret message
Alice’s result Bob’s result secret message
0 |+〉 0
0 |−〉 1
1 |+〉 1
1 |−〉 0
(9) If Alice is certain that there is no eavesdropping,
she announces the results of measurements of D se-
quence. Thus Bob can recover Alice’s secret message,
according to Alice’s result, as illustrated in Table 1.
Suppose Bob’s result is |+〉. If Alice’s result of mea-
surement of the corresponding D sequence particle is “0”
(“1”), they then conclude that the Alice’s secret message
is “0” (“1”).
III. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE
QSDC PROTOCOL
So far we have proposed the QSDC protocol. We now
discuss the security of the present protocol. The crucial
point is that the Hadamard gate at the step 2 and 3 of
the scheme do not allow an eavesdropper, Eve to have a
successful attack and Eve’s attack will be detected during
the eavesdropping check.
We first consider the intercept-resend attack strategy.
In this attack strategy, Eve intercepts the particles of B
sequence transmitted to Bob and makes measurements
on them. Then she resends a particle sequence to Bob
according to her results of measurements. Eve can only
intercept B sequence at the step 1 of the protocol and
she cannot make certain which particle will be executed
Hadamard transformation. Suppose Eve measures the
intercepted particle on which Alice and Bob will not per-
form Hadamard transformation in the Z-basis. In this
way, if the result of Eve’s measurement is “0”, she sends
a particle in the state |+〉 to Bob, otherwise sends a par-
ticle in the state |−〉. Then if Alice prepares a particle,
Pi(a) in the state |+〉, the state of [Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B)]
collapses to |+ 0+〉
aAB
or |+ 1−〉
aAB
each with proba-
bility 1/2. After Alice’s CNOT operation and Hadamard
transformation, the state becomes
|Ψi〉aAB =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)aA ⊗ |+〉B (9)
or
|Ψi〉aAB =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉)aA ⊗ |−〉B. (10)
Alice measures Pi(a) in the Z-basis and obtains “0” or
“1”, each with probability 1/2. She has only 50% proba-
bility of obtaining the right result. During the eavesdrop-
ping check, Eve’s attack will be detected easily. Similarly,
If Alice prepares a particle, Pi(a) in the state |−〉, the er-
ror rate introduced by Eve will also achieve 50%.
Suppose Eve measures the intercepted particle on
which Alice and Bob will perform Hadamard transfor-
mation in the X-basis. Note that |φ〉
AB
can also be ex-
pressed as 1√
2
(|++〉 + | − −〉)AB . If Alice prepares a
particle, Pi(a) in the state |+〉, then The state of [Pi(a),
Pi(A), Pi(B)] collapses to |+++〉aAB or |+−−〉aAB
each with probability 1/2. After the Hadamard transfor-
mations of Alice and Bob, the state becomes |+ 00〉
aAB
or |+ 11〉
aAB
. According to the protocol, the state is
changed to
|Ψ′
i
〉
aAB
=
1
2
√
2
(|0+〉+ |1−〉)aA ⊗ (|+〉+ |−〉)B (11)
or
|Ψ′
i
〉
aAB
=
1
2
√
2
(|0+〉 − |1−〉)aA ⊗ (|+〉 − |−〉)B (12)
Obviously, Eve’s eavesdropping will be detected during
the eavesdropping check. It will have the same result if
Alice prepares a particle, Pi(a) in the state |−〉.
We then consider the collective attack strategy. In this
strategy, Eve intercepts the particle Pi(B) and uses it and
her own ancillary particle in the state |0〉 to do a CNOT
operation (the particle Pi(B) is the controller, Eve’s an-
cillary particle is the target). Then Eve resends the par-
ticle Pi(B) to Bob. However, Eve cannot make certain
which particle will be performed Hadamard transforma-
tion. Suppose Bob will not perform Hadamard transfor-
mation on the intercepted particle. The state of Pi(A),
Pi(B), and Eve’s corresponding ancillary particle is
|Ω〉
ABE
=
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABE , (13)
where the subscript E indicates Eve’s ancillary particle.
According to the protocol, the state of the particle Pi(a),
Pi(A), Pi(B), and the corresponding Eve’s ancillary par-
ticle will be
|Ω0〉aABE =
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BE
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)BE
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BE
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|11〉 − |00〉)BE ] (14)
or
|Ω1〉aABE =
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)BE
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BE
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|11〉 − |00〉)BE
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BE ]. (15)
4Note that
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉) (16)
and
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉). (17)
We can rewritten |Ω0〉aABE and |Ω1〉aABE as
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BE
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉 − | −+〉)BE
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BE
−|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BE ] (18)
and
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BE
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉 − | − −〉)BE
−|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BE
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BE ] (19)
Alice then measures the particle Pi(a) in the Z-basis and
Bob measures the particle Pi(B) in the X-basis. Sup-
pose Alice’s random bit is “0” and her result of mea-
surement of the corresponding C sequence particle is “0”
(“1”). According to the protocol, Bob’s result must be
|+〉 (|−〉). Similarly, if Alice’s random bit is “1” and
her result of measurement of the corresponding C se-
quence particle is “0” (“1”). Thus Bob’s result must be
|−〉 (|+〉). However, Bob can only obtains the right re-
sult with probability 1/2 because of Eve’s eavesdropping.
During the eavesdropping check, half of Bob’s results will
be inconsistent with that of Alice’s. Thus Eve’s eaves-
dropping will be detected easily, because her eavesdrop-
ping introduces a error rate with 50%. Eve measures
the intercepted particle, but she can only obtain |+〉 or
|−〉 each with probability 1/2. Because she has no infor-
mation about Alice’s result, she cannot conclude what
Alice’s secret message is, even if she obtains Bob’s result
of measurement.
Suppose Eve execute Hadamard and CNOT opera-
tion on the intercepted particle which Bob will perform
Hadamard transformation on it. Note that |φ〉
AB
can be
expressed as 1√
2
(|++〉 + | − −〉)AB. Thus the state of
Pi(A), Pi(B) and Eve’s corresponding ancillary particle
will be
|ΩABE〉 = 1√
2
(|++0〉+ | − −1〉)ABE . (20)
After Hadamard transformation of Alice and Bob,
|ΩABE〉 is changed to 1√
2
(|000〉+|111〉)ABE which is equal
to the equation 13. As we described above, Eve’s eaves-
dropping can also be detected.
We now analyze the efficiency of the present protocol.
In our protocol, all EPR pairs are used to transmit the
secret message except those chosen for checking eaves-
droppers because the measuring basis of communication
parties is invariable. We only need to transmit parti-
cles once during the process of protocol, so we only need
eavesdropping check once. Twice transmission of EPR
particles and twice eavesdropping check are required in
Deng’s scheme.
IV. SUMMARY
So far we have proposed a QSDC scheme using EPR
pairs and analyzed the security and efficiency of the
present protocol. To prevent eavesdropping, Alice and
Bob perform Hadamard transformation on the randomly
selected particles. Alice encodes her secret message into
a given state and sends it to the receivers directly us-
ing quantum channel. Different from most of the QSDC
schemes, it is not necessary for our protocol to insure the
security of quantum channel before sending Alice’s secret
message. Without Alice’s result of measurement, the re-
ceiver or the eavesdropper cannot have any information
about Alice’s secret message. Alice announces her result
only if she is certain that there is no eavesdropping in
the line and only in such a way can the receiver recover
Alice’s secret message. The present protocol is efficient
in that all EPR pairs are used to transmit the secret
message except those chosen for eavesdropping check.
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